The national plans that did not provide real-time responses, the ministers who shifted responsibility onto each other, the chaos in information management - and the local authorities that had to handle hundreds of thousands of evacuees and those in transit on their own, without a government entity to guide them. The State Comptroller reveals a harsh picture of the evacuation of residents and their absorption during the war
Within the first three months of the Swords of Iron War, 210,000 residents were evacuated from northern and southern communities. Of this number, 130,000 individuals were proactively evacuated by the government in the initial month of the conflict, based on resolutions by both the security establishment and the government, and were subsequently accommodated in approximately 700 hotels across the country.
In response to the unprecedented scale of this evacuation, the Office of the State Comptroller undertook a comprehensive audit addressing multiple facets of the situation, encompassing the government’s preparedness for population evacuation prior to October 7, the execution of the evacuation process, the functionality of local authorities, the evacuating and the receiving, in addition to the management of information concerning the evacuees.
Who is Responsible for Home Front Care?
The audit, which assessed the methods employed by the government and the military in managing the evacuation and intake efforts, uncovered a series of significant failures. The State Comptroller had previously warned about some of these issues in the years leading up to the conflict, yet they were not rectified in a timely manner. Collectively, these factors contribute to a disconcerting overview. "The government and the IDF failed in the evacuation and intake of the residents", stated the State Comptroller and Ombudsman, Matanyahu Englman, upon the report's release (February 24, 2026). "Since the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and over the last two decades, Israeli governments, including the 37th government during the Swords of Iron War, have been tasked with regulating the care of the populace on the home front during civil and security emergencies; however, this has not been accomplished. This oversight has adversely affected the readiness and management of the home front during emergencies, as evidenced in the Swords of Iron War."
Consequently, instead of establishing a singular, centralized entity responsible for managing home front operations in emergencies, there exists a myriad of organizations, each deferring accountability to the next, while the Israeli government remains indecisive on the matter.
"Complete Disorder in Evacuation"
At the onset of the Swords of Iron War, there was no updated evacuation and intake plan in place: the national "Guest Hotel" Program had not received prior governmental approval, while the national "Safe Distance" Program remained an unratified proposal.
The State Comptroller indicated that "we discovered complete chaos in the evacuation processes of communities: localities failed to coordinate their evacuations with the IDF, leading to instances where residents were placed at unnecessary risk. Plans were not updated, there were no authorized operational national plans, and there was a lack of emergency training."
This chaotic condition was not merely evident during the initial days and weeks of the war but persisted for many months thereafter: "Seven months following the massacre, the Ministry of Education lacked information regarding 10,000 students."
As a result of unclear delineation of responsibilities, the treatment of evacuees has fallen and may continue to fall between the cracks.
"The Ministry of Interior is Absent"
The audit delineates a grim depiction of systemic failures among emergency bodies, such as ERC and NEMA, in preparations for population intake during emergency situations: "ERC conducted irrelevant drills – focused on schools rather than hotels. This approach has proven to be unfeasible during the Swords of Iron War, particularly for prolonged evacuation periods. Despite my appeal to the Prime Minister, he did not resolve the conflict between the Ministers of Defense and Interior regarding their respective authorities."
The audit revealed that the Minister of Interior and the Director General of the ministry did not activate the ERC system during the conflict, which should have provided an adequate response to each of the evacuees: "Even if the "Guest Hotel" Program was not made operational amid the state of emergency, it is unacceptable for the Ministry of Interior to claim it bears no responsibility for the population's intake and to refrain from activating the ERC system... Rather than adhering dogmatically to the established "Guest Hotel" resolution, it should have, at minimum, endeavored to mobilize as many resources and capabilities of the ERC system as possible to facilitate population intake. In practice, during this critical period, the Ministry proved absent in its functions, leaving local authorities without guidance and direction, despite its role as a central resource for addressing various issues."
The State Comptroller further criticized the Home Front Command for its "failure to deliver relevant responses to governmental ministries regarding the needs of those evacuating to hotels."
The Local Authorities Were Left to Their Own Devices
In times of emergency, the government, along with emergency and security agencies, bears the responsibility for ensuring the safety and well-being of the endangered population. However, the local authority maintains direct and continuous contact with the populace, making its engagement in monitoring the circumstances of the residents and facilitating evacuations when necessary crucial.
During the conflict, 15 local authorities were evacuated from both the northern and southern regions.
Hundreds of thousands of individuals were relocated to 90 local authorities.
Although the evacuated and receiving local authorities endeavored to assist the residents, the State Comptroller determined that the lack of relevance of the IDF and government plans adversely impacted local governance: "In the absence of a clear definition of the roles of an evacuated local authority, each evacuated authority acted toward its residents according to its capabilities and understanding.
"Consequently, the capacity of the evacuated local authorities to effectively serve their residents, while confronted with security threats and forced to suspend their familiar routines, was compromised. For instance, the residents of Kiryat Shmona were relocated to approximately 300 accommodation facilities, which resulted in an inability to adequately respond to the needs of the residents, thereby leading to unnecessary suffering and heightened anxiety and uncertainty."
State Comptroller Englman highlighted a discernible lack of order in the evacuation process in the southern region: "Aside from a few communities within the Eshkol Regional Council, whose residents were evacuated under fire on October 7 and in the subsequent two days, the evacuation was conducted independently by the local authorities. The placement in accommodation facilities was not executed according to an established plan, but rather according to availability. The intake sites were not articulated in government resolutions, nor were they included in the Ministry of Defense's evacuation directives; additionally, the principle of community cohesion was not upheld."
In his recommendations, the State Comptroller stated that "it is imperative to ensure that the receiving authorities possess readily available budgets, complete managerial flexibility, resources, and the requisite professional personnel during emergencies."
The Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman opted to participate in the "Sign of Life" initiative, commemorating some of the deceased and fallen in the titles of the chapter "Evacuation of the Population and Its Intake in Local Authorities". The fonts used were selected from a variety available on the project’s website, where designers created a typeface from the handwriting of those murdered and fallen in the terrorist attack on October 7 and during the Swords of Iron War, in an effort to leave a lasting legacy in our world.
"There was no orderly information infrastructure"
Another manifestation of the disarray surrounding the evacuation and intake of the population pertains to the management of information concerning the hundreds of thousands of evacuees. "At the onset of the war, the government lacked a computer system capable of centralizing and managing information regarding the residents who were evacuated from their homes", stated State Comptroller Englman. "This represents a failure that directly influenced the ability to implement a rapid, organized, and optimal response system for the substantial population that was displaced.
"The absence of an orderly information infrastructure also precluded the acquisition of a comprehensive situational overview, rendering it impossible to disseminate pertinent information from the system to every government ministry and local authority, thereby facilitating the provision of the most effective response. This led to duplicative efforts among the ministries within the hotels, burdened the evacuees with unnecessary bureaucracy, and manifested as uncoordinated governmental action.
"In the six months following the outbreak of the war, up-to-date information (in the Yahad system) was collected on only approximately 50% of the evacuees. State expenditures incurred to cover the costs of the evacuees’ stays in hotels and guesthouses amounted to approximately NIS 5.26 billion by the close of July 2024. However, the audit revealed that information regarding the evacuees was obtained solely from the hotels, rather than from a governmental entity that gathered information from the evacuees themselves. This impeded the ability to conduct effective, real-time oversight over government payments to the hotels."
The State Comptroller urged the Prime Minister, the ministers, and the IDF to address the deficiencies as expediently as possible: "The State of Israel must prepare for scenarios involving the evacuation of tens of thousands of citizens, particularly in light of the current security context".
Criticism across all echelons
Shortly following the massacre on October 7, the State Comptroller embarked on a series of tours in the communities in the Gaza Envelope, as well as in the southern and northern regions. The State Comptroller met with evacuees residing in hotels in Elat, the Dead Sea, Jerusalem, and various regions in the north.
On January 7, 2024, the State Comptroller announced the initiation of an audit encompassing approximately 60 issues, examined by about 200 audit managers within the Office of the State Comptroller. The State Comptroller emphasized three defining milestones for the audit:
- The audit will comprehensively assess all echelons – political, military, and civilian.
- In core audits and audits of additional issues, personal liability will be attributed to those accountable for any failures.
- Upon the establishment of a government investigative committee – the State Comptroller will delineate with it the parameters of its authority.
The initial intention was to publish reports addressing the core failures that facilitated the occurrence of the October 7 massacre within a few months. Nonetheless, an interim order – which was lifted in April 2025, following agreements reached by the Office of the State Comptroller with the IDF and the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) – delayed the audits concerning these matters by approximately 15 months. It is pertinent to note that the Office of the State Comptroller is currently also engaged in the audit process related to the core issues. An interim order issued by the High Court of Justice on December 29, 2025, suspends the audit of eight of these issues; however, audits on remaining aspects of the Swords of Iron War that are yet to be published continue.
In light of the prevailing circumstances, State Comptroller Englman determined that, given the significance of reports on civil issues, these reports will be published upon their completion, as was the case with these reports.
The Swords of Iron reports that have been published until now:
- Mental Health Treatment Following the Events of October 7 and the Swords of Iron War (11.2.25)
- The Operation of Resilience Centers in the Confrontation Line Localities since the Outbreak of the Swords of Iron War (11.2.25)
- The Regulation of the Community Emergency Response Teams Before the Swords of Iron War and their Operation since the Beginning of the War (11.2.25)
- The Provision of Aid to the Victims of Hostile Activity since the Events of October 7 (11.2.25)
- The Rehabilitation Processes of the Western Negev Settlements (24.2.25)
- Government Response to the Needs of Northern Communities During the Swords of Iron War: Civil-Economic Front (10.6.25)
- Economic Assistance to Small Businesses in the Initial Months of the Swords of Iron War (10.6.25)
- Taking Care of Special Populations by (Non-Evacuated) Local Authorities During Emergencies (23.7.25)
- Activity of the Educational Psychology Service for Emotional and Mental Support – in Routine Times and During the Swords of Iron War (23.7.25)
- Manpower in Emergency Situations in Local Authorities – Swords of Iron War (23.7.25)
- The Handling of Public Inquiries and Complaints by Local Authorities in Routine Times and During the Iron Swords War (23.7.25)
- Local Authorities' Preparedness for Fires – Follow-up Audit (23.7.25)
- the government handling of the civilian sphere during the Swords of Iron War (3.9.25)
- The City of Elat's Tourism Promotion and Economic Development in Light of the Swords of Iron War (16.9.25)
- The Agricultural Sector during the Swords of Iron War (16.9.25)
- Ensuring the State of Israel's Food Security in an Emergency (21.10.25)
- Operation Iron Swords – Economic and Budgetary Aspects (4.11.25)
- The Absence of a National Security Concept and the Ramifications to Fundamental Processes at Both the Political Level and within the Israel Defense Forces (11.11.25)
- Aspects of Support for Reservists (18.11.25)
- Ilan and Assaf Ramon International Airport – Elat: Airport Security Against Terrorist Threats and Preparedness for a Mass-Casualty Incident (2.12.25)
- Preparedness to Protect Critical Infrastructure Against Missiles, Rockets, and Other Aerial Threats – Follow-Up Audit (2.12.25)
- Effectiveness of the Seam Line Barrier and Crossings in the Jerusalem Periphery Area (2.12.25)
- A series of audit reports examining government bodies’ emergency preparedness (6.1.26)
