Comptroller Englman warns in a new report: Only 61 percent of the seam line barrier in the Jerusalem region are protected with a fence or wall – and many kilometers along it are breached or entirely open
- The effectiveness of the seam line barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem envelope area
The State Comptroller and Ombudsman, Matanyahu Englman, is publishing a serious report on the condition of Israel's seam line barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem envelope area. The Comptroller found many defects leading to a worrisome conclusion: The barrier and crossings are failing to provide an effective defense against terrorists and illegal aliens from entering Israel.
The seam line barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem envelope area, the Comptroller writes, are a vital layer of security for Jerusalem's residents and for Israel as a whole. The proper functioning of the seam line barrier and crossings is essential to preventing terrorist attacks and infiltrations into Israel, and also to ensure the provision of proper services to those using them, including Israeli citizens, Palestinians, East Jerusalem residents and students.
"An alarming picture"
"After the Simchat Torah massacre and the Swords of Iron War, the government and the defense establishment were compelled to learn lessons and properly prepare for defense on all fronts. The audit raised that there is insufficient study in the audited bodies and that similar failures that arose on other fronts have not been rectified", determines Comptroller Englman.
"Thus, an alarming picture is drawn whereby Palestinians can enter Israeli territory without any control or inspection while endangering Israeli residents. The defects in the report are cause for concern and must give the political and defense leadership sleepless nights".
The Jerusalem seam line extends for hundreds of kilometers and along it there are 16 active crossings. The Comptroller found that the police is struggling to fulfill its role in preventing infiltration of illegal aliens and carrying out inspections at the crossings. The police's responsibility is divided between the IDF, the police, the Border Police and the Israeli Security Agency – and the forces operate without close cooperation, a clear operational doctrine, permanent command structures and uniform training.
Decisions have not been implemented
As long ago as 2005 the then Prime Minister, the late Ariel Sharon, decided to transfer the responsibility for managing the crossings from the IDF to one single civilian authority. Despite the considerable effect such a move could have on daily life and security for Israelis, including East Jerusalem residents, and for the Palestinian population – the decision was never implemented, as well as other decisions by the prime minster and the government aimed at improving the effectiveness of the barrier have also not been implemented.
These decisions included Government Decision B/43 concerning the guiding factor at Jerusalem envelope crossings on the issue of security handling of passengers; Government Decision 4784, which addressed, among other things, the transfer of certain security responsibilities from the IDF to the police in a particular area in Jerusalem; and Government Decision 4783, whereby the fence route would be moved eastward in a specific area so that it would encompass this area and leave it on the Palestinian side of the fence. The audit found that the Security Cabinet has not even discussed the implementation status of these decisions, despite nearly two decades having passed since their approval.
Comptroller Englman writes that the defects and gaps in implementing these government decisions concerning the Jerusalem envelope has considerable security, political and even economic implications.
A death trap
The audit showed that observation command centers remained positioned near the seam line even after the events of October 7th. This situation, warns Comptroller Englman, could place the female observer soldiers in the Jerusalem envelope front at risk. Furthermore, intelligence coverage from observation systems is inadequate and requires improvement to allow a rapid response to infiltration attempts.
The audit found that the number of vehicle entrance lanes at crossings does not match the heavy traffic entering Israel from Judea and Samaria. Severe congestion is liable to become a death trap, as for example did occur in recent years at the Tunnels Crossing, where six Israelis were wounded in a terror attack in November 2023 – and in December 2024 a child was murdered when a bus came under fire.
The Comptroller warns that the Border Police manpower assigned to securing the barrier and operating the crossings is insufficient to meet all operational needs. A review of the shortage of manpower for ongoing security in the Jerusalem envelope showed a gap of 11.5% between the number of police officers required and those actually deployed. It further transpired that 30% of the time of the Border Police fighters assigned to security duties is dedicated to other tasks.
After the audit period ended, a deadly terrorist attack at Ramot Junction in Jerusalem claimed the lives of six Israelis and wounded about ten others. The attack was perpetrated by terrorists from Palestinian villages in the Ramallah area. Subsequently to the audit findings set out in the report, writes Englman, and against the background of the security risks arising from the hostile terrorist events perpetrated by attackers coming from the Judea and Samaria areas, in particular into Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, it is imperative to urgently rectify the defects identified in the audit while reviewing the implementation of the recommendations.
"We must complete the preparation"
The State Comptroller recommends that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security advance the long-delayed plan to civilianize the crossings, and calls upon the Israel Police to complete their preparations for mass-infiltration scenarios, as occurred on the Simchat Torah massacre.
"The Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of National Security, the Chief of the General Staff, the Police Commissioner, the Head of the Israeli Security Agency, the Commander of the IDF Central Command, the Jerusalem District Police Commander, and the Border Police Commander must immediately rectify the defects", summarizes Comptroller Englman, "and thereby not expose Israeli citizens to the danger of an October 7th style terrorist attack in the Jerusalem envelope".
